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The question whether a moral principle can be rationally 
justified has long had a central place in philosophical ethics. On 
its answer depends the possibility of construing the difference be-
tween what is morally right and what is morally wrong as objective 
and universal and hence as knowable by moral judgments on which 
all persons who use rational methods must agree. Although the 
question has been given an affirmative answer by many thinkers 
since the ancient Greeks, no version of the answer has received 
general assent among philosophers, for its opponents have been 
able to point out serious Haws. 
In this lecture, I want to do three main things. First, I shall 
show that the claims which have been made for a widely accepted 
contemporary version of the affirmative answer are without ade-
quate foundation, and I shall present some of the more basic diffi-
culties which confront any attempt to justify a moral principle. 
Second, I shall briefly sketch a rational justification of a moral 
principle, and I shall try to indicate, with what I hope is due cau-
tion, how it surmounts the aforementioned difficulties. Third, I 
shall examine how this justification of the principle can cope with 
other traditional objections. 
I 
I. The contemporary version to which I have referred rests on 
a doctrine about the illocutionary force of moral judgments, that 
is, a doctrine about what persons do or regard themselves as doing 
in making such judgments. According to this doctrine, a person 
who makes a moral judgment is not solely or primarily expressing 
some emotion or giving some command about men's actions; he is 
also claiming correctness or validity for what he says. This claim 
derives from the consideration that the judgment rests on sound 
reasons, consisting usually in relevant facts which can be set forth 
in true propositions. Although the emotivists had also recognized 
that reasons, even factual propositional ones, are given for moral 
judgments, they had insisted that these reasons have only an in-
citive or rhetorical function: to move one's hearers to accept the 
judgment. The contemporary rationalists, as I shall call them, 
rightly deny that reasons for moral judgments function or are in-
tended to function solely or primarily in this way; they point out 
that the reasons are held to validate or justify the judgments, to 
give them rational and not merely emotional or conative support. 
And while the rationalists agree with the emotivists that the reasons 
taken by themselves provide neither deductive nor inductive 
grounds for the moral judgments they support, the rationalists add 
the significant further point that when these reasons are given from, 
and confonn to, "the moral point of view," they do provide logical, 
indeed deductive, support for moral judgments. For example, the 
moral point of view contains as one of its main emphases the re-
quirement that for an action to be morally right it must be accept-
able to its agent when he is the recipient as well as the performer 
of such an action. Hence, a judgment that doing x is not morally 
right can be logically justified by showing that doing x is not in 
this way acceptable to its agent. For from the major premise that 
all actions which are morally right are acceptable to their agents 
when they are the recipients of such actions, and the factual minor 
premise that doing x is not acceptable to its agent when he is the 
recipient of x, the conclusion logically follows that doing x is not 
morally right. Thus, by assuming the moral point of view, reasons 
can be given which provide logically conclusive justifications for 
moral judgments. 
Despite its claim to have defended the rationality of morals, 
this approach marks no significant advance over the position of the 
emotivists and other anti-rationalists with respect to the problem of 
moral reasoning or justification. For these latter philosophers also 
held that when a moral principle is assumed, moral judgments can 
be logically supported by citing relevant facts, so that purely factual 
considerations or reasons can serve to resolve moral disagreements 
among men whenever the men in question agree on their moral 
principles, or agree "in attitude." What the emotivists denied was 
that the principles themselves, or the "system of values" which par-
ticular moral judgments presuppose, can receive any rational justi-
fication or argument. "Given that a man has certain moral princi-
ples, we argue that he must, in order to be consistent, react morally 
to certain things in a certain way. What we do not and cannot 
argue about is the validity of these moral principles."1 
•A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic (London, V. Gollancz Lrd., 1948), 
pp. 111-112. A similar view, that moral principles are ultimately matters of 
"decision" rather than of argument, is found in the "prescriptivist" doctrine of 
R. l\1. Hare. Sec The Language ofllfOTals (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1952), ch. 4, 
esp. p.69. 
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Now the conception of "the moral point of view" has the same 
logical status in the rationalists' doctrine as the conception of 
"moral principles" has in that of the emotivists: once the concep-
tion is assumed, moral judgments can be given a rational justifi-
cation. But the rationalists have not succeeded in giving a rational 
justification of "the moral point of view" itself. Either they make 
no attempt at such justification-and here they are at one with the 
emotivists-or if they do make the attempt, they are quite unsuc-
cessful. It is important to go into the difficulties which explain this 
lack of success; for they bear crucially on the whole question of 
the possibility of a rational justification of morality. 
2. Before examining these difficulties, we must consider the 
possibility that the moral point of view requires no justification at 
all. The main argument for this is that the moral point of view, or 
at least each of the main specific rules of which it is composed, is 
self-evidently true and is hence knowable by intuition. Some con-
temporary philosophers, reviving with greater sophistication the 
older intuitionism, have held it to be self-evident that, for example, 
the wanton infliction of pain on another person is always prima 
facie morally wrong, so that the fact that an action causes pain to 
another is at least an important even if not conclusive reason for 
not doing it.:: Similar self-evidence has been held to attach to the 
obligations to keep one's promises and to tell the truth. The moral 
point of view might then be thought of as a generalization from 
such self-evidences. 
In reply to this argument, it must be noted that if self-evidence 
attaches to certain moral rules like those referred to by intuition-
ists, it does so only when the specific principle which contempo-
raries call "the moral point of view" is assumed. The idea that 
such rules are independently self-evident runs into the familiar 
difficulty that their alternatives are and have been upheld; and the 
accusation that these upholders are morally blind simply stops 
argument when further argument is both needed and possible. 
What is referred to in the contemporary rationalist doctrine as "the 
moral point of view" is indeed definitive of a certain normative 
moral position, which is especially marked by its egalitarian uni-
• See William H. Gass, "The Case of the Obliging Stranger," Philosophical 
Rtmiew, vol. 66 (1957), pp. 193-204; J. R. Lucas, "Ethical Intuitionism II," 
Philosophy, vol. 46 (1971), pp. 9·10; Renford Bambrough, "A Proof of the 
Objectivity of Morals," American journal of jurisprudence, vol. 14 (1969), pp. 
37 ff.; G. J. Warnock, The Object of Morality (London, Methuen and Co., Ltd., 
1971). pp. 122-125. 
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versalism. Thus, one of its main principles is that "moral rules 
must be for the good of everyone alike."a But this is only the 
morality among many; it is opposed to other, inegalitarian-par-
ticularist moralities, such as those of Callicles, Aristotle, Nietzsche, 
and Hitler, which restrict in various ways and on various grounds 
the range of persons whose good must be furthered by moral rules. 
Such inegalitarian doctrines are moralities in the sense of being 
regarded by their respective upholders as supremely authoritative 
guides to action or ways of life, furthering important social as well 
as individual interests and propounding various criteria for the dis-
tribution of goods and evils.4 Hence, even if the guidance of life 
requires that one have some morality or other, this of itself does not 
justify the egalitarian-universalist moral point of view as over 
against any other specific morality. 
My conclusion, then, is that the moral point of view itself re-
quires justificatory argument: neither it nor its subordinate rules 
are self-evident, and both have alternatives which, in tenns of a 
non-question-begging definition of morality, are themselves moral 
ones. Particular moral judgments and general moral rules may 
have many different contents, each of which can be justified once 
the appropriate more general and higher-order principles are as-
sumed. Hence, the crucial question concerns the justification of the 
principles themselves: Which, if any, principle or set of principles 
can itself be rationally justified? 
In what follows I shall be concerned primarily with the justi-
fication of the principle of an egalitarian-universalist morality. By 
such a morality I mean a body of rules and criteria for individual 
action and social policy which accord to all men certain basic equal 
rights. While the precise application of these rights involves many 
sorts of circumstantial problems, the basic rights in question consist 
primarily in freedom from coercion by other persons and in certain 
essential aspects of well-being. My restriction to the principle of 
such a morality, as I envisage it, derives primarily not from a desire 
to reOect a parochial attachment to the ideals of our own culture 
• See Kurt Baier, Tile ./If oral Point of J'iew (Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University 
Press, 1958), pp. 2()()..204. Although Baier's book bears the title to which my 
remarks are addressed, the doctrines in question are also upheld by many other 
contemporary American and British moral philosophers. Baier's book contains 
some of the best discussions of these doctrines. 
'For discussions of this point, see the various papers collected in G. Wallace 
and A. D. M. Walker, eds., Tile De{initio11 of Morality (London, Methuen and 
Co .. Ltd., 1970). 
6 
but rather from the conviction that this morality is alone inherently 
right or valid. The question then is, Can this conviction, and the 
principle of the morality in question, be justified? 
3. Since the justification in question is to be a rational one, a 
helpful preliminary step will be to look at the concept of reason 
itself. In English, "reason" is used in three different although re-
lated senses, in two of them as a noun, and in one as a verb. As a 
noun, it is used in one sense to signify a certain power of the mind. 
This power may have several different aspects. One is the ability 
correctly to infer conclusions from premises or data. Thus we say, 
for example, "He used reason (and not mere guesswork) to arrive 
at the solution to the problem." Another aspect of this sense of 
"reason" as signifying a mental power refers to a certain quality of 
mind which is exhibited by persons who usc reason in its first as-
pect: a quality of calm, judicious weighing of evidence as a means 
of arriving at justified conclusions or beliefs, as against holding the 
beliefs capriciously or arbitrarily. In this aspect, for example, one 
may say of someone that he appealed to reason rather than emotion 
in his discussion of some problem. In a second sense, "reason" is 
used as a verb to signify the act of reasoning, that is, the activation 
or exercise of the power of reason in the first sense. Thus we say, 
"He reasons that because heat is applied, the gas will rise in the 
tube." In a third sense, "reason" is used as a noun to signify the 
ground of some conclusion or event, either as the explanation of 
some fact or as the justification of some act or policy. In this sense 
we refer to the reason why gas rose in a tube or to the reason why 
an action was done or ought to be done. I shall refer to these three 
senses of "reason" by the subscripts P, A, and G, signifying. respec-
tively, reason as power, as act, and as ground.ll 
The most direct way of relating these three uses of "reason" 
might seem to be as follows: "Reasonp reasonsA reasons0 ;" that is, 
when one's power of rcasonp is activated or exercised, one is said to 
reasonA, and the product of this exercise is a reason0 of some kind. 
This formula, however, blurs an important distinction. On the one 
hand, the connection between reasonp and reasonA is very close and 
indeed necessary, in that reasonA is simply the act of using rcasonr, 
although, of course, one may have reasonp without always using it. 
a Other languages share this feature of using the same word, or a closely re-
lated one, for the three senses of "reason." See, in French, raison for "rea-
son"r ••d 0 and raisonner for "reason".&; in Latin, ratio and ratiocinari; in Greek, 
l'.6-yos and l'.o'Yl!eaecu. 
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On the other hand, it must be noted that in one direction there is 
a much more serious lack of necessary connection between reason0 
and reason P or A. Even if, whenever reasonp reasonsA or infers, it 
necessarily does so from a reason0 , the converse necessity does not 
hold: one may have and act on a reason0 without having used 
reasonp to obtain it. For example, Smith's reason0 for shooting 
Jones may be that he hated him and wanted him to die; but this 
reason0 was probably not gotten by the use of reasonp. To be sure, 
given this reason0 , Smith may well have used his reasonp to infer 
that shooting Jones would lead to the end or effect he wanted to 
attain, which was his reason0 for his action. In other words, Smith's 
hatred for Jones and his wish to see him die set a certain end or 
purpose for Smith, to attain which he used causal reasoning to in-
fer the means. But this shows only that having a reason0 for an 
action may lead someone to use his reasonp to infer which action 
will serve as a means to carry out or effectuate that reason0 ; it does 
not show that the reason0 is itself attained by reasonp. In my above 
example, Smith's reason0 was his end or purpose in shooting Jones; 
but although Smith reasoned"' fmm this end to the means of achiev-
ing it, he did not reasonA to this end. He may have seized on this 
end from powerful emotional impulses. Hence, if an end or pur-
pose which one comes to in this way is irrational, or if more gener-
ally we say that a belief or goal which one acquires other than by 
the use of reasonp is, if not irrational, at least non-rational, then 
there may be many reasons0 which are either irrational or non-
rational. 
This distinction between reasonp and reason0 has a direct 
application to the moral rationalist doctrine discussed above. For 
even if the moral point of view functions as an ultimate reason0 or 
principle for the moral justification of actions or judgments, such 
that one reasonsA from this reason0 to infer conclusions about what 
one ought to do in particular cases, this does not at all entail that 
the moral point of view itself rests on reasonp. It need not have 
been established or ascertained by the use of reasonp at all. And 
since to be rational requires the use of reason1., it follows that the 
whole appeal to reasons0 for moral judgments does not entail that 
those judgments are rational, for the principle on which they rest 
need not have been ascertained by the use of reasonp. Consequently, 
despite all the talk about moral rcasons0 as deriving from the moral 
point of view, there still remains the problem of the rational justi-
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fication of one specific moral principle as against its various com-
petitors. 
As was suggested above by the distinction between "reasonp" 
and "reason.&,'' what I have here referred to as "the use of reasonp'' 
does not necessarily consist in some episodic or occurrent act of 
reasoning. It may instead be dispositional, in that for such use to 
exist in relation to some judgment or action it is sufficient that some 
essential part of the structure of reasoning could have been used to 
arrive at that judgment or action, and could be recognized by the 
person concerned as having this relation. The important question 
hence concerns the general nature or features of the structure of 
reasoning, which we must now consider with respect to morality. 
4. How, then, is reasonp to be used to justify a moral prin-
ciple? Philosophers have distinguished many different sorts of 
"reasonp" besides deduction and induction.0 Aristotle added re-
duction, reasoning by example, and the practical syllogism; Peirce 
added abduction; philosophers going back to Hegel if not to Plato 
have added various sorts of dialectical reasoning; moreover, some 
philosophers have held that there is a specifically moral kind of 
reasoning. This last, however, is often question-begging, in that it 
involves the use of the very moral principle one is trying to justify. 
According to this conception, reasonp in its morally relevant sense 
consists in evaluating proposed actions according to such criteria 
as whether they promote or harmonize the well-being of all the per-
sons affected by them, or whether the agent is willing to accept such 
actions when he becomes their recipient. To reason about actions 
in this way is indeed to apply an egalitarian-universalist moral 
principle; but it begs the question, which is how to give a rational 
justification of that very principle. To say that moral reasoning 
just is this sort of thing is also open to the objections indicated 
earlier, in connection with the claim that the "moral point of view" 
requires no justification at all. 
In discussing the problem of whether a moral principle can be 
• Sec C. D. Broad, Five Types of Ethical Theory (London, Kegan Paul, 
1930), pp. 105-6, 265; William R. Denncs, "The Appeal to Reason," in Reason, 
University of Cali£ornia Publications in Philosophy, vol. 21 (Berkeley, Univer-
sity of California Press, 1939), pp. 3·42: H. J. Paton, "Can Reason be Practical?", 
in In Defence of Reason (London, Hutchinson's University Library, 1951), pp. 
ll?-156; Kai Nielsen, "Appealing to Reason," Inquiry, vol. 5 (1962), pp. 65-84. 
Sec also the essays collected in Bryan R. Wilson, ed., Rationality (Oxford, Basil 
Blackwell, 1970) and in R. F. Dearden et al., eds., Education and tile Develop-
ment of Reason (London, Routlt:dge and Kcgan Paul, 1972), Part 2. 
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justified by reasonp, and in giving my own presentation of such a 
justification, I shall restrict myself to deduction and induction as 
the two relevant kinds of reasonp. While recognizing that questions 
may be raised about both the exclusiveness and the exhaustiveness 
of this dichotomy of deduction and induction, I think these ques-
tions can be satisfactorily answered.7 In addition, this restriction is 
supported by a basic feature traditionally attributed to reasonp: its 
avoidance of, and opposition to, arbitrariness. The arbitrary is 
that which depends on and varies with one's inclinations or preju-
dices. The rational, on the other hand, is guided and restricted by 
norms or criteria which obtain and are valid quite independently 
of one's inclinations or prejudices; it is hence that which sets 
standards to which one must conform if one is to attain correct be-
liefs or conclusions, as against having one's beliefs reflect one's own 
whims or predilections. In this respect, inductive logic is rational 
because its beginning-point, sense perception, reflects what is coer-
cive in experience as against what may be varied according to arbi-
trary whim, and because it seeks to regulate men's probable infer-
ences on the basis of these coercive sense-experiences rather than 
hopes or desires. (For present purposes I shall ignore the objec-
tions raised on this point by philosophers like Descartes and 
Leibniz). In a broader sense, induction includes any attempt to 
establish general conclusions on the basis of particular data. In a 
parallel way, deductive inference is rational because it restricts 
valid conclusions to what necessarily follows from premises in vir-
tue of antecedently admitted meanings of symbols, as against what 
one might like to have follow from the premises. In short, the 
rational is opposed to the arbitrary insofar as it takes account of 
what is cognitively necessary or coercive either logically or em-
pirically. Hence, Descartes knew what he was up to when, in order 
to subject the claims of reasonp to the severest possible test, he hy-
pothesized that all the logical and empirical necessities and coer-
civenesses of reason might be varied according to the arbitrary 
whim of an omnipotent evil demon. Whether there are other bases 
of such cognitive necessity or coerciveness besides those grounded 
in sense-perception and logical consistency is a point into which we 
need not now enter. It will be sufficient for present purposes if de-
ductive and inductive reasoning in their various aspects can be 
"See, for example, S. F. Barker, "Must Every Inference Be Either Deductive 
or Inductive?", in Max Black, ed., Philosophy in America (Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell 
University Press, 1965), pp. 58-?8. 
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shown to be sufficient for the justification of a moral principle. 
And in restricting ourselves to deduction and induction we shall 
not be open to the accusation that we have used either an idiosyn· 
cratic or a question-begging sense of "reasonp" to obtain our con-
clusion. 
In the remainder of this section I shall indicate some of the 
chief difficulties which must be overcome by any attempt to give a 
rational justification of any moral principle, and especially an 
egalitarian-universalist one, by the use of inductive or deductive 
reason. In the next section I shall try to show how these difficulties 
can be overcome. 
5. First, then, inductive reasoning: can it be used to justify an 
egalitarian-universalist moral principle? I shall here include each 
of the following under inductive reasoning: (a) the appeal to em-
pirical facts either to refute or to confirm the empirical assumptions 
on which a moral principle rests; (b) means-end calculation, in-
cluding "rational choice;" (c) generalizing from men's particular 
moral judgments to the general principle which systematizes them 
or which is implicit in them; (d) arguing from the validity or co-
gency of some specific choice-procedure to the validity or cogency 
of the moral principle which would be chosen by the use of that 
procedure. 
(a) It has sometimes been held that all inegalitarian moral 
principles depend crucially on empirically false assumptions or 
correlations, such as that persons belonging to certain empirically 
discriminable groups-races, religions, nations, and so forth-have 
more of some desirable quality, such as intelligence or industrious-
ness, than persons belonging to other such groups. Hence, all 
inegalitarian principles can be refuted by showing the falsity of the 
empirical correlations on which they depend, so that an egalitarian 
principle is left unchallenged and is hence justified, at least by 
default. 
This sort o£ argument would not work, however, against 
inegalitarian moral principles which do not rest on empirical cor-
relations. Such principles directly assert that persons who have in 
superior degree certain unequally distributed qualities, such as in-
telligence, industriousness, or political ability, should have superior 
rights. These assertions are justified by an appeal to elitist ideals as 
to maximal human development, with no attempt to correlate the 
persons who have these qualities with the members of other em-
pirically discriminable groups. 
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This consideration also shows the inadequacy of another sort 
of attempted empirical justification of an egalitarian-universalist 
moral principle. It is sometimes argued that because all men 
equally have certain needs or desires, it follows that all men ought 
equally to have the means of satisfying these needs or desires. En-
tirely apart from the gap here between "is" and "ought", there is 
the further difficulty that the second type of elitist just mentioned 
can always deny, in the light of his inegalitarian ideal, that the men 
in question are all of equal value, since they are unequal with re-
spect to the quality which is crucially relevant for the allocation of 
rights. 
(b) Some philosophers have tried to justify an egalitarian-
universalist moral principle by an appeal to means-end calculation 
or "rational choice" concerned with choosing the most efficient 
means to one's desired ends, where the chooser is an individual 
whose end is to maximize his own happiness or well-being. The 
general point, which goes back to Hobbes if not to Plato, is that the 
only way to be sure of attaining one's own happiness or of success-
fully pursuing one's interests is by giving equal consideration to 
the happiness or interests of all other persons who are affected by 
one's actions. On this view, prudence or self-interest and egalitarian 
morality coincide, at least so far as concerns the actions which each 
of them requires, so that an egalitarian-universalist moral principle 
is justified by being shown to be in accord with rational sel£-
interest.s 
This argument is unsuccessful, however, because an individual 
whose sole concern is to pursue his own interests will at least some-
times, and perhaps often, be able to achieve his ends by violating 
either the legitimate interests of other persons or rules which aim 
impartially at the good of everyone else. 
An important attempt to avoid this result has been made by 
John Rawls in his much more sophisticated version of the use of 
rational choice to justify an egalitarian moral principle. Rawls' 
salient addition consists in the double stipulation that men who are 
choosing a basic moral principle for the constitution of their society 
are in an "original position" of equality with respect to power and 
• See Baier, op. cit., ch. 12; Kai Nielsen, "Why Should I Be Moral?", 
Methodos, vol. 15 (1963), pp. 275·306; D. A. Lloyd-Thomas, "Why Should I Be 
11-foral?", Pllilosoplly, vol. 45 (1970), pp. 128-139. For a quite different approach 
to this question, see my "Must One Play the Moral Language Game?", American 
Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 7 (1970), pp. 107-118. 
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freedom, and that each is equally encumbered by a "veil of igno-
rance" about his own particular qualities. Given these equalizing 
stipulations together with primarily self-centered motives, the men 
in question will choose an egalitarian moral principle, which is 
therefore justified by rational choice.0 
While endorsing many of Rawls' results as well as the careful 
way in which he works them out, I think that he attains his egali· 
tarian conclusion only by a seriously circular argument. For the 
veil of ignorance, in addition to its obvious non-rational (because 
non-cognitive) features, is, like the assumption of original equality, 
a way of removing from the rational choosers' consideration certain 
factors, consisting in the actual empirical inequalities and dissim-
ilarities which obtain among men, which, together with their self-
interest, would strongly influence them to make inegalitarian 
choices. Neither of the stipulations by which Rawls avoids this 
inegalitarian result has any independent rational justification: men 
are not in fact equal in power and ability, nor are they so lacking 
in empirical reason as to be ignorant of all their particular qual-
ities. This Iauer stipulation, that of ignorance of particulars, goes 
far beyond the limited assumption of ignorance which actual ra-
tional men make when they choose under conditions of uncertainty. 
Hence, Rawls' egalitarian conclusion is achieved only by putting 
into his premises an equality which cannot itself be justified either 
by empirical facts or by consideration of cognitive adequacy (as 
opposed to ignorance). 
(c) Many moral philosophers have held that the only way in 
which any moral principle can be justified is by generalizing from 
men's particular moral judgments to the general principle which is 
implied or presupposed by the judgments. The particular judg-
ments are hence the independent variables, so to speak, and the 
general principle is accepted as correct or valid insofar as it reflects 
in a general way what is judged to be right or wrong in those 
particular cases. 
A more complex version of such an inductive justification has 
been upheld by Nelson Goodman in respect of the principles of 
deductive and inductive inference, and this in turn has been ap-
plied by Rawls to the justification of a moral principle. The pat-
tern of the justification is that general rules or principles of logical 
inference or of morality are justified by being shown to be in 
8 John Rawls, A Theory of justice (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University 
Press, 1971), chs. 1-4. See especially pages 14, 143,293,401 If., 413 If. 
18 
accordance with the particular logical inferences or moral judg-
ments which we actually make and accept, and the particular in-
ferences or judgments are in turn justified by being shown to be in 
accordance with general rules or principles of inference or of 
morality. The circularity which is present here is held to be virtu-
ous rather than vicious, because the justification of both the general 
principles and the particular inferences or judgments consists in 
their being brought into agreement or "reflective equilibrium" 
with one another. to 
Whatever be the merits of such an inductive justification with 
regard to the principles of logical inference, it suffers from a serious 
difficulty when applied to morality-a difficulty already encountered 
earlier in my discussion of the possible self-evidence of a moral 
principle. The inductive justification assumes that we can quite 
unambiguously differentiate the morally right from the morally 
wrong in men's particular moral judgments, and can hence infer 
what is the morally right general principle by generalizing from 
the morally right particular judgments. This would work well 
enough so long as there is no serious dispute over the particular 
judgments which are taken as the sources. But what if there is such 
dispute; what if the judgments are challenged by a Callicles or an 
Aristotle, a Nietzsche or a Hitler? In this case, to appeal to the 
principles to settle the dispute would beg the question, since the 
principles rest exclusively on the particular judgments which the 
opponents are disputing. A principle which shows that alternatives 
like those just mentioned are morally wrong must do so not simply 
because it is itself a generalization from the opposed alternatives-
for this is question-begging-but because it has an independent 
rational justification of its own. 
(d) Some philosophers have tried to justify a moral principle by 
using what I shall call a reflexive method. By this method, one 
infers that a moral principle is valid or cogent from the fact that it 
would be chosen by a mental procedure which is itself valid or 
cogent, in that the procedure embodies such valuable mental char-
acteristics as being fully informed, free, imaginative, sympathetic, 
calm, impartial, willing to universalize, acting on principle, con-
sidering the good of everyone alike, and so forth. The most famous 
version of this reflexive method is the "ideal observer" theory 
10 See Nelson Goodman, Fact, Fiction, and Forecast (Indianapolis and New 
York, Dobbs-Merrill Co., 1965), pp. 63-64; Rawls, op. cit., pp. 20·21, 48·51, 120, 
579. 
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stemming from Adam Smith. Other versions of the method attempt 
to justify a moral principle or principles through a certain "quali-
fied attitude" or through the "considered judgment of a competent 
person" or through a "rational choice among ways of life" or 
through "the moral point of view."n 
These reflexive methods of justification all suffer, however, 
from a fatal dilemma. The mental characteristics or procedures 
which they regard as decisive in justifying one moral principle as 
against another are themselves either morally neutral or morally 
non-neutral, i.e., normatively moral. If the characteristics are 
normatively moral, then the argument is obviously circular. For in 
this case a moral principle will have been justified by assumptions 
which are themselves normatively moral ones, as to which mental 
characteristics or procedures are morally right as against morally 
wrong. But it is precisely these assumptions which had to be justi-
fied. Such characteristics as being impartial and sympathetic are 
among the obvious instances of this; for a man who is partial to 
himself (or to some favored group) in certain contingencies by 
making exceptions in his own favor, or who is lacking in sympathy 
for others who are suffering, is rightly condemned on moral 
grounds. If, on the other hand, the mental characteristics or pro-
cedures in question are morally neutral, as is the case with being 
fully informed, imaginative, and calm, then there is no guarantee 
that such non-moral traits will lead to the selection of one moral 
principle as against another, nor in particular to an egalitarian-
universalist principle. A man may have such traits and still choose 
a moral principle which assigns superior rights in respect of well-
being and freedom to persons of superior intelligence, political 
ability, and so forth. 
I conclude, then, that while each of the varieties of inductive 
reasoning considered above makes a suggestive contribution, none 
is sufficient to justify an egalitarian-universalist moral principle. 
6. Let us now turn to deductive reasoning: is it any better off 
in this respect? If we envisage a moral principle as the conclusion 
of a deductive inference in some sort of unilinear sequence, the 
u For these, sec respectively, Roderick Firth, "Ethical Absolutism and the 
Ideal Observer," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 12 (1952), pp. 
317·345: Richard B. Brandt, Ethical Tlleory (Englewood Clilfs, N.J., Prentice-
Hall, 1959), ch. 10; John Rawls, "Outline of a Decision Procedure for Ethics," 
Pllilosopl1ical Review, vol. 60 (1951), pp. 177-197: Paul W. Taylor, Normative 
Discourse (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1961), ch. 6; Baier, op. cit., 
cbs. 7-8. 
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following difficulty arises. To justify something is to show its right-
ness or correctness as dependent on or following from something 
else. What is to be justified, the justificandum, is hence, in the 
justificatory sequence, logically posterior to that which justifies it, 
the justificans. A principle, however, is what is logically prior or 
first in some field, in that everything else in the field depends for its 
justification more or less directly on the principle while the prin-
ciple in turn is not dependent on or justified by anything else. 
Consequently, the very idea of justifying a principle seems contra-
dictory for it requires showing the dependence of what is inde-
pendent, the logical posteriority of what is logically prior, giving 
the justification of that whose justification cannot be given. 
Even if this difficulty is overlooked, the attempt to justify a 
principle by deductive reasoning appears to involve either an in-
evitable circularity or a certain superfluity. For the only things left 
to justify the principle are the very justificanda or consequents 
which it is the function of the principle itself to justify; hence, the 
justificanda can justify the principle only if it has already been 
assumed that the justificanda have themselves been justified by the 
principle. But if this assumption is made, then there is no need to 
justify the principle, for the latter could not have justified the 
justificanda unless it were already understood at that point to be 
itself in no need of justification. And if the principle is justified 
by the justificanda only because the latter have been justified by 
the principle, then the question of the principle's justification is 
obviously begged. Hence, the justification of the principle is either 
circular or superfluous. 
The difficulties so far considered apply to the attempt to justify 
a principle in any field, including logic and empirical science. 
There are further difficulties when the principle one is trying to 
justify is a moral one. For insofar as a morality consists in rules of 
action which are regarded as supremely authoritative by the persons 
who accept them, there seems to be no possibility of deriving the 
principle of such rules from some superior source, since this prin· 
ciple is itself held to be supreme in the practical order. 
Even if this difficulty is waived, the attempt to justify a moral 
principle by deducing it from some superior principle incurs the 
following dilemma. The superior principle in question must itself 
be either moral or non·moral. 1£ it is a moral one, so that the 
justification which is given is also moral, then this obviously begs 
the question. For a moral justification of a moral principle already 
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assumes, in its criterion of justification, the very principle which is 
to be justified: the justi{icans is the same as the justi{icandum. If, 
on the other hand, the superior principle from which the moral 
principle is deduced is a non·moral one, then it is doubtful on 
many grounds whether the moral principle can be justified at all. 
In particular, there is the logical question of just how a moral prin-
ciple containing an "ought" can be justified by premises which are 
theological, or biological, or psychological, or sociological, and the 
like, which do not themselves contain any "oughts". The familiar 
problems of naturalism and heteronomy arise here. 
The principle of universalizability is sometimes held to sur-
mount these difficulties of deductive inference. To begin with, the 
principle has the feature of logical necessity which is characteristic 
of deductive inference in general. Just as in a deductive inference 
one cannot affirm the premisses and deny the conclusion, on pain 
of self-contradiction, so in universalization one cannot, without 
self-contradiction, affirm that a predicate P belongs to a subject S 
because S has some quality Q-where the "because" means sufficient 
reason or sufficient condition-and deny that P belongs to all other 
subjects 51, S2, ••• 50 which have quality Q. In other words, the 
principle of universalizability says that if a predicate belongs to 
one subject for a certain sufficient reason, then it logically must 
belong to every other subject which fulfills that sufficient reason. If 
this inference is denied, then one contradicts the original statement 
or assumption that one has given a sufficient reason for the predi-
cate's belonging to the first subject. 
The principle of universalizability has a direct moral appli-
cation in such a form as: What it is right for one person to do, it 
must be right for any similar person in similar circumstances to do. 
Here, as before, it is explicitly assumed that the attribution of right 
to the first person's acting is based on a certain sufficient reason, 
and this rightness logically must characterize the same kinds of 
actions of all other persons who fulfill that sufficient reason. It is 
this fulfillment which supplies the criterion of relevant similarity 
in the principle's statement that all the other persons in question 
must be similar to the first. Thus, if it is right for S to do x (for 
example, to make a lying promise) because S has Q (where "Q" 
signifies, for example, wanting to avoid mild inconvenience, and 
where the "because" is, as before, that of sufficient reason or suffi-
cient justifying condition), then it logically must be right for any 
other person who wants to avoid mild inconvenience to make a 
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lying promise. The moral bite of the principle of universalizability 
in its moral application consists in this logical requirement that a 
person who claims some right for himself must acknowledge that 
all other persons who are relevantly similar to him also have that 
right. For the principle thereby rules out the kind of special plead-
ing by which persons or groups make exceptions in their own favor; 
it requires instead that persons be impartial toward one another 
and accord one another equal rights. And since the principle is a 
purely logical one based on the concept of a sufficient reason, it 
would follow that deductive reasoning alone is able to disjustify all 
particularistic moralities and hence, at least implicitly, to justify 
an egalitarian-universalist morality. 
Nevertheless, the principle of universalizability does not pro-
vide a sufficient ground for such a morality. The reason for this is 
that the principle allows two important kinds of variability with 
respect to content. First, as to the actions which it is right to per-
form, the principle sets no limits on these other than the variable 
desires or opinions of the agents or other protagonists. Thus, since 
the principle says that what it is right for one person to do it must 
be right for any relevantly similar person to do, A may without 
inconsistency claim the right to do anything he likes to B so long 
as A would be willing to undergo that same kind of action should 
he come to have the qualities which he adduces as his justification 
for so acting on B. Second, as to the criteria of relevant similarity 
or the sufficient reasons for having the right to perform various 
actions, the principle of universalizability likewise sets no limits on 
these, so that agents or other. protagonists can tailor these criteria 
or reasons to suit their own variable desires or prejudices. Thus, so 
far as the principle is concerned, A may without inconsistency 
claim the right to infiict various harms on other persons on the 
ground of his possession of qualities which are had only by himself 
or by some group he favors; or, alternatively, on the ground of his 
recipient's possession of qualities quite different from his own. 
Hence, the agent will not have to worry, so far as the argument 
from universalization is concerned, about situations where he might 
become the recipient of the sort of harms he infiicts on others, since 
the sufficient reasons for having the right to inflict these harms per-
tain only to himself or his own group. And even if it is insisted 
that the agent, in order to apply the princi pie, must imagine him-
self as being in the position of the recipient, this still leaves it open 
that fanatical agents may be willing to be recipients of such harm-
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ful actions. It is these variabilities as to the actions one might be 
willing to undergo and as to the criteria of relevant similarities 
that remove whatever egalitarianism might otherwise be thought to 
characterize the principle of universalizability. Since the content 
provided for the principle is contingent on these variable features 
of men's desires and prejudices, it admits of many outcomes other 
than egalitarian-universalist ones. 
So far as the above considerations have shown, then, reasonp 
as applied both in deductive and in inductive reasoning is unable 
to justify an egalitarian-universalist moral principle. This inability 
has had several sides. Formally, some of the attempted justifications 
have been circular, including in the premisses the very egalitarian-
universalist principle they have purported to justify. Materially, 
others of the attempted justifications have left the door open to 
moralities which are opposed to egalitarian universalism. Various 
other logical difficulties have also been noted. 
Despite these negative results, I think it is possible to give a 
rational justification of an egalitarian moral principle which avoids 
the above shortcomings. Since I have presented this justification in 
various other places,t2 I shall here confine myself to sketching the 
main argument and shall then consider how it fares with respect 
both to the difficulties indicated above and to other sorts of ob-
jections. 
II 
It must be stressed at the outset that in the rational justifi-
cation to be presented here I aim to use reasonp only in the senses 
to which I restricted myself above, those of inductive and deductive 
inference. One salient aspect of my procedure concerns the logical 
status of various assertions I shall make about human action and 
its relation to morality. While recognizing that this question in-
volves many complex issues, I shall interpret these assertions as 
conceptual or logical analyses of the concept of action, rather than 
as statements of the criteria of action or as inductive generaliza-
tions. I shall interpret the conceptual analyses, moreover, on the 
model of deductive inference, such that the various components 
into which a complex concept is analyzed belong to it with logical 
12 See my "Categorial Consistency in Ethics,'' Philoso(lllical Quarterly, vol. 
17 (1967), pp. 289-299: "Obligation: Political, Legal, Moral,'' Nomos, vol. 12 
(1970), pp. 55·88; "The Justification of Egalitarian Justice,'' American Philo-
sophical Quarterly, vol. 8 (1971), pp. 331-341. In my forthcoming book, Reason 
and Morality, I present a detailed development of the argument. 
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necessity, so that it is contradictory to affirm that the complex con-
cept applies and to deny that one of its component concepts applies. 
It will be helpful to give a brief summary of my argument 
presenting a rational justification of an egalitarian-universalist 
moral principle before spelling it out in somewhat greater detail. 
The main point is that the voluntariness and purposiveness which 
every agent necessarily has in acting, and which he necessarily 
claims as rights for himself on the ground that he is a prospective 
agent who wants to fulfill his purposes, he must also, on pain of 
self-contradiction, admit to be rights of his recipients. For they are 
similar to him in being prospective agents who want to fulfill their 
purposes. Therefore, every agent logically must admit that his re-
cipients have certain basic rights equal to his own rights of volun-
tary and purposive participation in transactions, which are equiv-
alent, respectively, to rights of freedom and of well-being. The 
statement of these rights constitutes an egalitarian-universalist 
moral principle. My argument hence largely takes the form of 
what I shall call dialectical necessities: dialectical, in that it pro-
ceeds through certain claims made by agents; necessities, in that 
these claims logically must be made by the agents and they also 
logically must accept the corresponding obligations. 
Now for a somewhat more detailed statement of the argument: 
I. All moral rules and judgments about what is right or obli-
gatory deal, directly or indirectly, with human actions. Moral rules, 
regardless of their highly variable contents in different moral sys-
tems, arc intended for the most part to direct or guide the perfor-
mance of actions by persons who know what they are doing and 
who can initiate and control their movements or behavior in the 
light either of the rules in question or of other purposes which the 
agents have in view. Moral judgments are intended, at least in part, 
to evaluate the agent's performance of actions insofar as he is 
accountable for them. 
2. Hence, actions as delimited by moral rules and judgments, 
in the general sense of "moral," must have two main features. First, 
they are voluntary, in that the agent who performs them knows 
what he is doing and initiates or chooses and controls his behavior, 
without his choice being forced. (The choice and control, even if 
lacking at the time of the immediate act, must have been present 
at an earlier stage, as in cases of culpable negligence). Second, they 
are purposive, in that the agent intends to do what he does, envisag-
ing some purpose or goal which may consist either in the perfor-
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mance of the action itself (whether or not it conforms to some rule) 
or in some outcome of that performance; in either case, insofar as it 
is the purpose of his action the agent regards it as some sort of good. 
(The kind of goodness here in question need not, of course, be 
moral). 
I shall henceforth call voluntariness and purposiveness the 
categorial features of action, since they characterize the whole cate-
gory of morally relevant action, as against the features of more 
particular kinds of action within this category. 
Since agents are persons who perform actions in the sense just 
specified, it is necessarily true of every agent that he acts volun-
tarily and purposively. 
By a "transaction" I shall mean an action in which an agent 
acts on at least one other person, whom I shall call the recipient. 
It is necessarily true of every agent, then, that qua agent he par-
ticipates voluntarily and purposively in transactions in which he is 
involved. 
3. Since, in acting, the agent acts for some purpose which 
seems to him to be good, this good constitutes for him his justifi-
cation for performing the action, so that he regards his action as 
justified. Hence, he regards himself as having a right to perform 
the action, and he makes a corresponding right-claim. It must be 
emphasized, however, that the justifications and rights here in 
question, like the goods, need not be moral ones; they vary accord· 
ing to whatever criteria the agent invokes explicitly or implicitly in 
the purposes for which he acts,13 
As we saw earlier, it is necessarily true of every agent that qua 
agent he participates voluntarily and purposively in transactions in 
which he is involved. Hence, the point just made can be put in 
similar terms: every agent necessarily claims, at least implicitly, 
that he has a right to participate voluntarily and purposively in 
transactions in which he is involved. It may be objected that one 
cannot rationally claim to have a right to do what one cannot help 
doing; and since the agent cannot help participating voluntarily 
and purposively in transactions in which he is involved qua agent, 
he cannot rationally claim to have the right to participate in trans-
actions in these ways. My answer to this objection is that what the 
agent claims to have a right to do is not merely to participate 
voluntarily and purposively but to participate in these ways in 
"'I have dealt with this point in some detail in "The Nonnative Structure 
of Action," Review of Metaphysics, vol. 25 (1971), pp. 238-261. 
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particular transactions. He can avoid participating as an agent in 
particular transactions, and it is to these participations that he 
claims to have the right in virtue of what seems to him to be the 
goodness of the purpose for which he acts. I shall give a further 
answer to this objection below, after some additional necessary 
steps have been sketched. 
4. Every right-claim is made on behalf of some person, at least 
implicitly, under a certain description or for a certain sufficient 
reason. Although the descriptions or sufficient reasons adduced by 
agents may vary widely, the only description or reason for his 
action which the agent is rationally justified in giving is that he is 
a prospective agent who has some purpose which he wants to ful-
fill. For it is this description which is necessarily and universally, 
hence invariably, connected with the category of action which, as 
we have seen, is the general subject-matter of morality and practice. 
Another way to see this point is as follows. In order to be 
rationally justified, a procedure must be non-arbitrary. But any 
agent's procedure in making his right-claim is arbitrary so long as 
he is permitted to pick and choose according to his own predilec-
tions from among the varying descriptions or sufficient reasons 
which may enter into his right-claim .. The only way to halt this 
arbitrariness, and hence to establish his claim on a rationally justi-
fied basis, is to restrict its content to what is necessarily and univer-
sally connected with its subject-matter, as against what is optional 
or left to the agent's discretion. Hence, insofar as the agent's neces-
sary right-claim is restricted to what he is rationally justified in 
claiming, his claim that he has a right to participate in the trans-
action in which he is involved must refer to himself qua prospective 
agent who wants to realize some purpose of his. 
This point, bearing as it does on the criterion of relevant sim-
ilarities, is so crucial with respect to egalitarianism that it requires 
some further consideration. Its crucial character can be seen from 
the fact that the description under which or the sufficient reason 
for which an agent claims the right to do something constitutes for 
him the criterion of relevant similarities, that is, the criterion as to 
the respect in which other persons must be similar to him in order 
for them logically to have the same right as he claims for himself. 
Hence, in the kind of argument which is being developed here, an 
egalitarian-universalist conclusion that all men have an equal right 
to something can be logically justified only if the quality in respect 
of which men must be similar, in order to have the right in ques-
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tion, is a quality which is had equally by all men. We must, then, 
subject any such proposed criterion of relevant similarity to the 
closest possible scrutiny in order to test whether the criterion is it-
sci£ rationally justifiable or whether the only basis for introducing 
it is to support the egalitarian principle we are trying to establish. 
'While I cannot here present the full scope of such a scrutiny, 
I can at least indicate some of its main aspects. I have been dis-
cussing the description under which or the sufficient reason for 
which the agent claims the right to participate voluntarily and pur-
posively in transactions in which he is involved; and I have asserted 
that the only way in which he can avoid arbitrariness with respect 
to this description or sufficient reason is by holding that it consists 
in being a prospective agent who has some purpose he wants to 
fulfill. Now this description is obviously a very general one, and it 
will lead to an egalitarian result since all men equally satisfy the 
description. It may be objected, however, that the agent may ful-
fill the rational requirement of avoiding arbitrariness by holding 
that the description under which or the sufficient reason for which 
he claims the right to perform his action is something much less 
general, namely, the specific purpose for which he acts. It is ob-
viously this specific purpose, whatever it may be, that constitutes 
his reason for acting; for example, to obtain some money, to win a 
political victory, and so forth. Hence, in citing this specific purpose 
the agent would be telling the truth about the ground of his right-
claim, and at the same time he would be giving a specific character-
ization of his action. The characterization I have proposed, on the 
other hand, is excessively general, since it says that the agent claims 
the right to perform his action merely in virtue of being a prospec-
tive agent who wants to fulfill his purposes: a characterization 
which pertains equally to all persons whatsoever. 
There are at least two interrelated replies to this objection. 
One is that the agent's specific purposes may themselves be arbi-
trary in that they reflect desires on his part for which there is no, 
or insufficient, rational justification. Specific purposes are them-
selves in need of rational justification; at least, much of the point 
of a rational moral principle is to evaluate men's contingent pur-
poses by reference to non-arbitrary, rational criteria. My conten-
tion is that the rationality in question is to be achieved by removing 
from the ground of the agent's right-claim those of its aspects which 
do or may reflect his own particular desires or predilections, and 
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recurring instead to that aspect of it which, being necessary and 
universal, is impervious to such contingent influences. 
A second reply to the objection is that the agent, after all, 
claims the right to participate voluntarily and purposively not only 
in his present action with its particular purpose but in all his 
actions. To restrict to his present purpose his reason for claiming 
an action-right is to overlook the fact that he regards his voluntary 
and purposive participation as a good in respect of all his actions 
and purposes, not merely his present one. It would, therefore, be 
arbitrary of him to single out just one purpose-his present one-or 
just one description of himself-that of an agent who is now acting 
-as the sufficient reason for which or the description under which 
he claims the right to act. For this attachment to the present would 
ignore its pervasive similarities to his other purposes and states in 
respect of his reasons for acting. Hence, when the agent's right-
claim is restricted to what he is rationally justified in claiming, 
from within his own standpoint in purposive action, he must claim 
this right insofar as he is a prospective, not merely a present, agent 
who wants to fulfill his purposes in general, whatever they may be, 
not just his present, particular purpose.u 
This conclusion also bears on the objection considered above, 
that it is anomalous if not contradictory for the agent to claim a 
right to do what he cannot avoid doing, namely, to participate 
voluntarily and purposively as an agent in transactions. My earlier 
answer to this objection stressed that the agent claims the right to 
participate voluntarily and purposively as an agent in his particu-
lar transactions, and he can avoid participating in this, since 
whether or not he initiates the transaction is under his control. 
From the discussion just concluded, however, we can derive a fur-
ther answer to the objection. For the agent rationally claims the 
right to participate voluntarily and purposively not only qua pres-
ent agent but also qua prospective agent; and in the latter capacity 
it is not the case that he cannot avoid participating voluntarily and 
purposively in transactions in which he is involved. For although 
" I have previously discussed the criterion of relevant similarities in ''The 
Justification of Egalitarian Justice" (cited above, n. 12). See also my analyses of 
this question in ''Some Comments on Categorial Consistency," Philosophical 
Quarterly, vol. 20 (1970), pp. !180-384; "The Non·Trivializability of Universal-
izability," Awtralasian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 47 (1969), pp. 12!1-131; "The 
Generalization Principle," Philosophical Review, vo1. 73 (1964), pp. 229-242, at 
pp. 237·240. I also discuss other problems of universalizability and the criterion 
of relevant similarities in a monograph, "Ethics," to be published in Encyclo· 
paedia Britannica. 
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it is necessarily true that insofar as he is an agent he participates 
voluntarily and purposively in the transactions he initiates, it is by 
no means necessarily true that his participation in all his future 
transactions will be voluntary and purposive, since his participa-
tion in them may not be as an agent at all. His relation to these 
future transactions is at most only that of prospective agent who 
wants to fulfill his purposes, not that of present agent. Hence, since 
his voluntary and purposive participation in future transactions is 
not inevitable insofar as he is a prospective agent who wants to 
fulfill his purposes, there is no contradiction or conflict in his 
claiming the right so to participate. This right·claim, however. is 
itself necessary, given that the agent acts or wants to act for pur-
poses that seem to him to be good. 
5. It follows from this that every rational agent logically must 
accept the generalization that all prospective agents who want to 
fulfill their purposes have an equal right to participate voluntarily 
and purposively in transactions in which they are involved. This 
generalization is a direct application of the principle of universal-
izability; and if the agent denies the generalization he contradicts 
himself. For he then denies what he has implicitly affirmed insofar 
as he is rational: that he has the right so to participate because he 
is a prospective agent who wants to fulfill his purposes. For in this 
affirmation he has held that possession of the categorial feature of 
being a prospective agent who wants to fulfill his purposes is a 
sufficient reason or justifying condition for having the right in 
question. 
Now the recipients of the agent's action are themselves pro-
spective agents. Hence, the agent logically must acknowledge that 
they have rights. equal to his own, to participate voluntarily and 
purposively in transactions in which they are involved with him. 
Their right to participate voluntarily entails a correlative obliga-
tion on the agent's part not to coerce them; their right to partic-
ipate purposively entails a correlative obligation on the agent's part 
not to frustrate their purposes and hence not, especially in basic 
respects, to harm them. The general principle of these obligations 
and rights may be expressed as the following precept addressed to 
every agent: Apply to your recipient the same categorial features 
of action that you apply to yourself. I shall call this the Principle 
of Categorial Consistency (PCC), since it combines the formal con-
sideration of consistency with the material consideration of the 
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categorial features of action, including the right-claims which the 
agent necessarily makes. 
The PCC is an egalitarian-universalist moral principle, be-
cause it requires of every agent that he be impartial as between 
himselC and his recipients when the latter's freedom and welfare 
are at stake, so that the agent must respect his recipients' freedom 
and welfare as well as his own. To violate the PCC is to establish 
an inequality or disparity between oneself and one's recipients with 
respect to the categorial features of action and hence with respect 
to whatever purposes or goods are attainable by action. 
This, then, concludes my brief sketch of the rational justifi-
cation of an egalitarian-universalist moral principle. The main 
point, put succinctly, is that what for any agent are necessarily 
goods of action, namely freedom and well-being, or at least the ab-
sence of harm, are equally goods to his recipients, and he logically 
must admit that they have as much right to these goods as he does, 
since the ground or reason for which he rationally claims them for 
himself also pertains to his recipients. The many further com-
plexities of this doctrine, including the various ways in which the 
principle is able to account for justified departures from equality of 
rights, must be left for another occasion. 
My justification of the PCC has been rational in that it has 
argued from what is necessarily involved in the concepts of action 
and reason. The argument, then, has been primarily deductive, in-
cluding the use of the principle of universalizability to bring out 
the inconsistency which results from denying a certain entailment 
based on the idea of a sufficient reason. 
How does my justificatory argument cope with the difficulties 
I set forth in my first section? To begin with, there is no vicious 
circularity in the argument; my premisses, bearing as they do on 
the necessary, categorial features of action, do not include in any 
direct or explicit way the egalitarian-universalist moral principle 
which is to be justified. Since, however, the argument is intended 
as a necessary deductive one, it must be admitted that the moral 
principle is in some sense implicitly present in the premisses. But 
this is implicit only. The conclusion arrived at is genuinely in-
formative, in that it has not been recognized that implied in the 
concept of being an agent is the further concept of making right-
claims on the ground of having purposes and envisaging goods, and 
that this ground logically requires an extension of the rights in 
question to the recipients of the agent's action. Hence, this logical 
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containment of the PCC in the premisses does not constitute the 
sort of obvious, vicious circularity which characterized the kinds of 
arguments I examined in my first section. 
In addition, the principle which my argument justifies is an 
egalitarian-universalist one, although the full specification of this 
would require many further details into which I cannot enter here. 
Since my justificatory argument has been deductive, how does 
it cope with the above-indicated difficulties of the deductive justi-
fication of a moral principle? My answer comprises three main 
points. The first is that my justificatory argument has appealed to 
general principles of reason, including especially the requirement 
of consistency. Second, my argument has proceeded by an analysis 
of the concepts of action and reason. Since action is the primary 
genus of morality, in that moral rules arc precepts as to how men 
should act, the first two points amount to saying that a moral prin-
ciple is deduced from rational considerations about the features 
which necessarily pertain to all action. Since these considerations 
are logically prior to specifically moral considerations, because the 
moral is subsumed under the rational and the practical, the diffi-
culties of deriving a moral principle from some superior principle 
are to this extent resolved. A moral principle is indeed logically 
first in the field of morality, but this field belongs to the wider 
fields of rationality and action, and a moral principle can be de-
duced from principles of these wider fields without losing its logical 
primacy within the field of morality itself. 
Third, this deduction also resolves the problem of how a moral 
principle with its "ought" can be derived from a superior principle 
which does not contain any "ought". For I have argued that right-
claims, with their correlative obligations or "oughts", are logically 
implied in all purposive action, in that, as indicated above, every 
agent claims the right to perform his action on the ground of what 
he regards as the goodness of its purpose, so that he also holds that 
no one ought to interfere with his action. Hence, the sequence 
from action to morality is not merely from an "is" to an "ought" 
but rather from a context which implicitly contains an "ought" to 
another context in which this "ought" is made explicit. This 
"ought", moreover, is a moral one not only because, pertaining to 
all action, it is unescapable in the practical order, but also because 
it entails requirements as to how agents are to treat their re-
cipients where their freedom and welfare are mutually involved. 
These considerations also bear on the ways in which my use of 
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the principle of universalizability surmounts the difficulties char-
acteristic of most moral applications of it. These difficulties, to 
which I called attention above, arise from the variabilities as to 
content which the principle admits: variabilities as to the actions 
which it is right to perform and as to the criteria of relevant simi-
larities. My argument avoids these difficulties because it substitutes 
rational necessities for these contingent contents. 
First, as to the actions which it is right to perform, whereas the 
usual applications of the principle allow agents to choose and de-
scribe these actions according to their own inclinations or ideals, 
regardless of how their recipients might react to them, my appli-
cation of the principle restricts the agent's action-descriptions to 
necessary contents, that is, to the categorial features of action, vol-
untariness and purposiveness. It is these features that the agent 
must apply to his recipients. Unlike the actions permitted by the 
usual applications of universalizability, these features are neces-
sarily acceptable to the recipients because they embody what is 
directly involved in freely acting for one's purposes. 
Second, as to the criteria of relevant similarities, whereas the 
usual applications of universalizability allow agents to choose and 
describe these according to their own desires, my application re-
stricts these criteria to descriptions which are necessarily and uni-
versally connected with the category of action, namely, the descrip-
tion of being a prospective agent who wants to fulfill his purposes. 
Because this description pertains equally to all agents and recipi-
ents, my application of universalizability necessarily entails an 
egalitarian-universalist moral principle, as against the inegalitarian 
and particularist moralities permitted by the usual applications of 
universalizability. Both of these shifts in respect of content, from 
variable to necessary features of action and criteria of relevance, 
result from applications of reason in that basic respect in which it 
is opposed to what is arbitrary. In this respect, reason requires that 
the features of action and criteria of relevance which give content 
to the logical form of universali1.ability not be permitted to vary 
according to the agent's contingent predilections, but that they re-
flect necessary and universal aspects of their subject-matter. 
If my above arguments have been successful, then, it is possible 
to give a rational justification of an egalitarian-universalist moral 
principle. Or, to put it otherwise, reasonp, in a non-question-beg-
ging sense, is on the side of egalitarian universalism; it is neither 
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morally neutral, as Hume held, nor does it, as Plato and Aristotle 
thought, justify an inegalitarian morality. 
Ill 
According to my above argument, every rational agent must 
accept the PCC on pain of self·contradiction. This, I have held, is 
a consequence of the concept of a rational agent. My argument, 
then, has proceeded by conceptual analysis, and, as I indicated 
earlier, I shall interpret this as meaning that the PCC and the 
moral rules and judgments which follow from it are all analytic. 
Now there are many traditional objections to regarding moral 
principles and judgments as analytic. Before considering some of 
the main ones, I wish to point out that the way of construing moral 
judgments which I have sketched above provides an answer to the 
vexed question of whether, and how, moral judgments are suscep-
tible of truth and falsity. My answer does not involve an intuition-
ist appeal to the meaning of normative moral expressions, nor does 
it make the truth of moral judgments relative to their being ac-
ceptable from "the moral point of view" in the sense discussed 
earlier.JG According to my account, moral judgments are primarily 
concerned to attribute duties or obligations to rational agents and 
correlative rights to their recipients; and these attributions are true 
if they follow from the concept of what it is to be a rational agent 
in the ways indicated above. Unless an agent admits that his action 
is unjustified-in which case he admits defeat so far as concerns his 
right to perform his action-it follows from the concept of being an 
agent that he claims certain rights for himself, and it follows from 
the concept of being rational that his right·claim is made under a 
certain description. Hence, it follows from the concept of being a 
rational agent that every such agent must admit both that his re-
cipients, all of whom fulfill that description, also have the rights he 
claims for himself, and that he has correlative obligations toward 
his recipients. It is in this way that all correct moral judgments 
tasee Warnock, op. cit., pp. 118·125; Baier, op. cit., pp. 173·186; Kai Nielsen, 
··on Moral Truth," American Philosophical Quarterly, Monograph Series No. 
l (1968), pp. 9·25; Alan R. White, Trut/1 (London, Maanillan Press, Ltd., 
1970), esp. pp. 57·65. A quite different approach to the truth of moral judg· 
ments can be found in the important "ontological" alternative set forth by 
Henry B. Veatch, For an Ontology of Morals (Evanston, Ill., Northwestern 
University Press, 1971); sec esp. Ch. VI. Unlike the other references given in 
this note, Veatch's doctrine focuses on goodness as an objective property of 
things; this provides a direct basis for attributing truth to moral judgments. 
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are analytically true: it is logically necessary, by virtue of the con-
cept of being a rational agent, that such moral judgments be 
accepted by every rational agent. 
The logical structure of a moral judgment, according to the 
above account, hence conforms to the pattern of dialectical neces-
sity which I said would characterize my arguments. Strictly speak-
ing, a moral judgment is not simply of the form: "A ought to do 
x;" rather it has the more complex form: "If A is to be a rational 
agent, then he must admit (or accept) that he ought to do x." For 
the reasons mentioned earlier in connection both witl1 the non-
arbitrary character of reason and with the necessity of the cate-
gorial features of action, this "if-then" structure does not make 
moral judgments hypothetical or contingent on men's variable in-
clinations or ideals. Moral judgments are addressed to rational 
agents in the sense of agents who are capable of attending to and 
being influenced by rational considerations (although, of course, 
this capacity may often not be exercised, or be exercised incorrectly, 
in relevant circumstances). Hence, the structure of a moral judg-
ment may also be expressed as follows: "A, qua rational agent, 
ought to do x." The PCC and the moral judgments which follow 
from it are analytically true, then, in that they indicate what actions 
ought to be performed by rational agents, as following from what 
must be logically admitted by such agents. Every rational agent 
logically must admit that he ought to apply to his recipients the 
same categorial features of action that he applies to himself; hence, 
he ought to refrain from coercing or inflicting basic harm on his 
recipients, and also, by virtue of this requirement, he ought if pos· 
sible to give certain basic kinds of assistance to other persons. 
Without taking up here the further elucidations which the 
various applications of the PCC require, I want now to examine 
some of the main objections against regarding moral judgments as 
analytic and logically necessary. 
I. Objection. What is analytic is purely linguistic, in that the 
predicate of an analytic statement pertains to its subject simply in 
virtue of the meaning of the subject-term. Hence, an analytic 
statement reflects only linguistic usage. But this yields no substan-
tive conclusions either about the nature of things or about the 
contents of valid moral norms. From the fact that a word has a 
certain meaning nothing follows about what one ought to do, even 
if the word in question is "good," "ought," "action," or "reason." 
To put it otherwise, an analysis of meanings yields only indicatives 
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about language, not imperatives or guides to action. Hence, there 
is no basis for presenting the PCC in the imperative mood, as I 
have done. 
Reply. The analytic statements presented in my above argu-
ment for the PCC re8ect not merely idiosyncratic or even conven-
tional meanings of words but rather concepts which signify objec-
tive properties. This is also the case with many other analytic 
statements. For example, it is an analytic truth that if X is longer 
than Y and Y is longer than Z, then X is longer than Z; but the 
transitive meaning of "longer" on which this truth is based derives 
not merely from linguistic usage but rather from factual character-
istics of this relational property itself.JO It is because the relation 
of one thing's being longer than another is transitive and because 
men are aware of this transitivity that in their linguistic usage 
"longer than" signifies a transitive relation. Similarly, even if my 
statements are analytic that all actions delimited by moral and 
other practical rules are voluntary and purposive, that agents make 
implicit claims that they have the right to perform their actions, 
and so forth, this analyticity depends not on my idiosyncratic de-
cisions or even on conventional linguistic usage alone, but rather 
on the properties of the relevant actions and agents, as signified by 
the respective concepts. Some analytic truths arise because men can 
conceptually understand extra-linguistic properties and make lin· 
guistic classifications based on that understanding. More generally, 
to characterize some statement as analytic is by no means necessarily 
to hold that it is "purely linguistic" or that there are not good 
extra-linguistic reasons for the classifications of the meanings of the 
terms comprising the statements. 
As for the objection that the analysis of meanings yields only 
indicatives, not imperatives or moral norms, it is important in this 
respect to distinguish the position of the agent from that of the 
philosopher who analyzes what is involved in being an agent. The 
philosopher's analysis does, indeed, yield only indicatives; but 
among these indicatives are statements which point out that agents 
logically must make right-claims, which can be reformulated as 
imperatives. The fact that the philosopher presents right-claims 
only in indirect discourse-in such a statement as, "An agent claims 
that he has the right to do x"- does not militate against the further 
10 I have previously argued for this in "The Distinction between Analytic 
and Synthetic Truths," ]oumal of Philosopl1y, vol. 50 (1953), pp. 397·425, at 
pp. 419-424. 
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fact that right-claims logically must, at least implicitly, be made in 
direct discourse by agents, as in "I have the right to do x." Hence, 
from the standpoint of the agent the conceptual analysis of his 
action shows that he logically must accept, as being made by him-
self, certain right-claims and hence certain ought-judgments and 
imperatives (summed up in the PCC), even though, from the stand-
point of the philosopher, the results of such analysis consist only in 
indicatives or in "cognitive propositions." 
The agent cannot reject these right-claims and the consequent 
ought-judgments on the ground that their attribution to him re-
flects merely the philosopher's linguistic usage or conventional 
meanings of words. Rationally to reject these attributions, the 
agent would have either to admit that what he is doing is wrong or 
to deny that he acts for purposes which he regards as good. The 
former alternative would constitute an admission of defeat so far as 
concerns the justification of what he does, so that the agent would 
at least implicitly accept a negative ought-judgment concerning his 
action. The latter alternative would fly in the face of the pur-
posiveness which characterizes his action. Hence, unless the agent 
is willing to concede that his purpose in acting is a bad one overall 
-in which case he accepts a negative ought-judgment about his 
action-he must admit that he makes an affirmative, normative 
claim for his action. It is such normative claims or judgments on 
the part of agents which conceptual analysis shows to be necessarily 
involved in action. Hence, such analysis also shows that the PCC 
and the moral rules which follow from it are rationally justified, in 
that they must be accepted by a rational agent as logically implied 
by the right-claims which he necessarily makes under the only de-
scription which he is rationally justified in giving. 
2. Objection. What is analytic is vacuous, i.e., it has no sub-
stantive content, since it is reducible to the form "What is A is A." 
Hence, it cannot serve to guide any actions. In order to guide 
action, a judgment must be informative in that it tells us that some 
independently identifiable action is to be done or not done. If this 
independent identification of the action cannot be made, i.e., if we 
cannot identify the action without already knowing that it has the 
moral predicate which the judgment attributes to it, then we don't 
know what action it is that we ought or ought not to do. For ex-
ample, an analytic moral judgment, such as "Murder is wrong," 
requires that we already know that the action in question is wrong, 
since "murder" simply means wrongful killing. Hence, it amounts 
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to saying that killing which one ought not to do is something that 
one ought not to do. But it doesn't enable one to identify which is 
the sort of killing which one ought not to do. Hence, it cannot 
serve to guide our action.t7 
Reply. We must distinguish between explicitly and implicitly 
analytic statements and between logical and psychological vacuity. 
In an implicitly analytic statement, such as "Every (Euclidean) 
triangle has angles which are equal to two right angles," the predi-
cate is deducible from the definition of the subject only through 
several intermediate steps, and this may be psychologically quite 
informative. In such statements one can identify the subject in 
terms, say, of concepts A and B without already being aware that 
the subject logically or implicitly also contains concepts X, Y, and 
Z. It follows from this that analytic moral judgments may give 
practical guidance if they are only implicitly analytic. For in such 
judgments the kind of action which the statement says is right or 
wrong can be identified independently of our being aware that the 
moral predicate applies to that kind of action. Thus, in specific 
reference to the PCC, we can know that a transaction is such that 
the recipient does not participate in it voluntarily and purposively, 
independently of knowing that such a transaction is wrong; and 
yet its necessary wrongness follows logically from the PCC, which 
is itself analytic by virtue of the concepts of "action", "agent", and 
"reason" as indicated above. 
3. Objection. Any moral or other practical rule must be such 
that it is possible for the persons addressed by the rule both to obey 
it and to violate it. If both these alternatives are not available to 
the persons addressed, then there is no point in having or setting 
forth the rule. But it is logically impossible to violate an analytic 
moral rule. For a rule to be violated is for something (an action 
or a refraining from action) to occur which is the opposite of what 
the rule requires. But the opposite of what an analytic moral rule 
requires is self-contradictory, and what is self-contradictory cannot 
occur. Hence, violations of analytic moral rules cannot occur. 
Repl)'· There is a crucial ambiguity in the statement, "the 
opposite of what an analytic moral rule requires is self-contradic-
"For this objection, see especially George Nakhnikian, "On the Naturalistic 
Fallacy,'' in H. N. Castaneda and Nakhnikian, cds., Morality and the umguage 
of CoJ1drtct (Detroit, Wayne State University Press, 1963), pp. 153·155. Sec also 
Hare, op. c:it., pp. 41-42, and jonathan Harrison, Ottr Knowledge of Right and 
Wrong (London, Allen 8: Unwin, 1971), Ch. IV. 
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tory." This contention is correct if by the "what" in question is 
meant the whole content of the rule itself; for example, the oppo-
site of "One ought to refrain from wrong killing" or "One ought to 
refrain from coercing one's recipient" is self-contradictory. But the 
contention is incorrect if by the "what" is meant the action referred 
to in the rule; the opposite of refraining from wrong killing or 
from coercing one's recipient is not itself self-contradictory. Hence, 
one can violate an analytic moral rule even though to deny the 
rule, or to affirm its opposite, is to contradict oneself. 
It is important in this respect to be clear about the relation 
between a rule and its violation. In the case of a rule of the form 
"Doing x is wrong.'' its violation consists in doing x, not in bring-
ing it about that doing xis not wrong. Hence, the violation of the 
rule is not affected by the relation between doing x and wrongness, 
since it consists only in doing x. But since what makes a moral rule 
analytic, on the view here under consideration, is the relation be-
tween an act and its deontic predicate-specifically, that the predi-
cate is logically contained in the concept of the subject-act-their 
relation is not affected by whether or not the act is performed. Thus, 
even in the case of an explicitly analytic moral rule like "wrong 
killing is wrong," its violation consists in wrong killing. not in 
bringing it about that wrong killing is not wrong. What is self-
contradictory or logically impossible is that an act which is wrong 
be not wrong, not that the act be performed. But when one per-
forms a wrong act one does not thereby make the act not wrong. 
Hence, the performance of a wrong act or the violation of an ana-
lytic moral rule is not a case of doing what is contradictory or 
logically impossible. 
These considerations apply directly to the PCC. A person who 
violates the PCC contradicts himself because he holds that a right 
which belongs to him insofar as he fulfills a certain description, 
and which hence belongs to all persons who fulfill that description, 
does not belong to another person who fulfills that description. But 
this contradiction pertains to the content of his beliefs. which is a 
logical matter; it does not affect the fact that his action occurs 
removing the right in question from the person to whom it right-
fully belongs. His action does not make right what is wrong-this 
would indeed be self-contradictory. But in performing his violative 
action, even if he says that his action is right, his violation consists 
in removing from someone a right which rightfully belongs to the 
latter, not in bringing it about that that right does not rightfully 
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belong to him. To put it otherwise, the analyticity of a moral rule 
or judgment essentially involves its normative, not its empirical 
content, its rightness or wrongness, not the empirical facts which 
enter into it. To violate the rule or judgment consists in bringing 
or refraining from bringing certain empirical facts into existence-
e.g., in assaulting or failing to rescue someone. But what is analytic 
about the rule or judgment turns not on the existence of the facts, 
but on a certain moral predicate's pertaining to the facts. 
4. Objection. If the PCC is genuinely a moral principle, then 
it must be practical in the sense that it serves to guide action. In 
order to guide action it must give persons a reason for acting in one 
way rather than in another. But the only reason which the PCC 
gives for acting is that a person who violates it contradicts himself or 
is otherwise irrational in the sense of arbitrary. This, however, 
does not provide a genuine reason for acting in accordance with it. 
A genuine reason for acting must be practically efficacious in that 
it presents a motive for persons' acting in one way rather than in 
another. The consideration of self·contradiction, however, is rarely 
efficacious in this way, except for logicians and other persons en-
gaged in theoretic pursuits. Hence, the PCC, so far as concerns the 
basic argument I have presented in its support, confuses the kind 
of reason which is appropriate to theoretic statements with the kind 
of reason which has practical bearings. 
Reply. The traditional distinction between justifying and 
motivating reasons must be reiterated here. Reasons may be prac-
tical by setting forth justificatory criteria bearing on action even if 
men are not thereby moved to act in accordance with them. Since, 
as we have seen, actions implicitly involve right·claims on the part 
of rational agents, and since in transactions these claims may con-
flict with the rights of the recipients, the morally practical question 
is not: Which side can influence the other to move in the favored 
direction?, but rather: Which side is rationally justified? Now the 
most basic way of proving that a position is not rationally justified 
is to show that it involves a contradiction, for freedom from self-
contradiction is the necessary condition of all rational justifiability. 
Hence, considerations of consistency and self·contradiction are di-
rectly relevant to practical reasoning. 
5. Objection. Even if freedom from self<ontradiction is the 
necessary and most basic condition of rational justification, this has 
no specific bearing on moral justification. To contradict oneself is 
to make an intellectual mistake, but this is different from making 
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a moral mistake in the sense of doing what is morally wrong. To 
base the rational justification of the PCC on the consideration that 
agents who violate it contradict themselves is to confuse the kind of 
justification which a person lacks when he says that 2 added to 3 
equals 6 and the kind he lacks when he wantonly kills or assaults 
someone. 
Reply. The PCC's rational justification as a moral principle is 
based not on the formal consideration of consistency alone but also 
on the fact that its content is morally relevant, in that it is con-
cerned with interpersonal relations in situations of potential con-
flict. The content to which the PCC's formal consideration of 
consistency is applied is the agent's claim that he has the right to 
participate voluntarily and purposively in the transaction in which 
he is involved with his recipient insofar as he (the agent) is a 
prospective agent who wants to fulfill his purposes; and the appli-
cation of the PCC to this claim reflects the logical requirement that 
to avoid inconsistency the agent must admit that his recipient, who 
is also a prospective agent who wants to fulfill his purposes, also 
has the right to participate voluntarily and purposively in the 
transaction in which he is involved with the agent. '.Yhat is thus 
admitted entails, by virtue of the conceptual relation between 
"right" and "ought", that no one (including the agent) ought to 
prevent the recipient from participating voluntarily and pur-
posively in the transaction in which he is involved with the agent. 
Now this is a moral "ought"-judgment, because it bears on the pur-
poses or interests of someone other than the agent. Hence, the 
logical requirement of consistency, when applied to the categorial 
features of interpersonal action, yields a moral requiremenL 
Categorial consistency in its very concept is a moral as well as 
a logical requirement, so that the extensional equivalence of the 
two requirements in the PCC is not merely coincidental. The rea-
son for this is that the PCC bears not on consistency of beliefs or 
actions on the part of one person in isolation, but rather on con-
sistency which is transactional and hence interpersonal. To be 
categorially inconsistent is to claim for oneself the most basic rights 
of action in a transaction with other persons, while denying these 
rights to the persons who are affected by one's action and who are 
relevantly similar to oneself. It is therefore to make exceptions in 
one's own favor and hence to be unfair to others. To violate the 
PCC is hence to do what is morally as well as logically wrong. 
The distinction between "logical" or "intellectual" and 
36 
"moral" justification, while helpful in some respects, may lead one 
to ignore the fact that all morally relevant actions lay claim to 
rightness in the sense of rational justifiability. The rightness in 
question may not be directly moral in the sense of bearing on the 
interests of other persons; but it becomes moral once, through the 
universalization discussed above, the right-claim's predicate is nec-
essarily extended to other similar persons. Now to show that such 
claims are not rationally justifiable is to subject them to the most 
basic kind of condemnation: a kind whose criteria cannot ration-
ally be escaped or denied by anyone who engages in rational dis-
course or communication. 
6. Objection. It is not the case that consistency is the necessary 
condition of all rational justification, for it may sometimes be ra-
tional to contradict oneself. A Machiavellian ruler, for example, 
may find it expedient to make mutually inconsistent statements 
when this advances his end of maximizing his power. Since a basic 
kind of rationality is the use of efficient means for achieving one's 
ends, such self-contradiction is rational. It may even be morally 
right to contradict oneself. For example, X says to Y's friend, "Y 
is in this house"; shortly thereafter, when an armed gangster Z 
comes looking for Yin order to murder him, X says to Z, "Y is not 
in this house." Since X's statement to Z prevents a murder and is 
intended to do so, X's self-contradiction is morally justified. 
Reply. When it is said that consistency is the necessary condi-
tion of all rational justification, it is important to be clear about 
the kind of justification which is in question. What is primarily 
involved is not the efficient use of means for whatever ends one 
happens to have, nor is it even the intention to say what is true, 
although the latter is much closer to rational justification than the 
former. The crucial point is the opposition between the rational 
and the arbitrary. The arbitrary is what can be tailored to one's 
wishes or whims, regardless of what these may be; hence, it provides 
ultimately no objective or independent check or test of what one 
says or does. To be sure, the Machiavellian ruler's mutually in-
consistent statements are tested for their adequacy by their effective-
ness in advancing his end of self-aggrandizement. But this end is 
not in its turn similarly tested against any further criterion of ade-
quacy or correctness in the Machiavellian context. Hence, the 
Machiavellian ruler's use of language in such contexts is ultimately 
arbitrary, in that it is dependent for its adequacy on ends not them-
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selves subjected to scrutiny by criteria which are independent of his 
own predilections. 
The rational, on the other hand, reflects criteria which are in-
dependent of one's whims or predilections. The use of language 
for the end of telling the truth is hence rational because, in order 
to conform to this end, one's statements must correspond to objec· 
tive states of affairs. And consistency is basic to this rationality 
because two mutually inconsistent statements "p" and "-p" can-
not both be true; hence, one cannot be rationally justified in the 
attempt to fulfill the objective criterion of truth if one says both 
Hp" and .. -p." 
These considerations also apply to the morally justified mak-
ing of inconsistent statements, as in my above example of X's help-
ing to save Y's life. When X says to Z, " Y is not in this house," X 
intentionally says what is false and intentionally contradicts him-
self; yet his saying this is rationally justified. For X is trying to 
prevent a murder. Murder is the most extreme case of an agent's 
applying to his recipient different categorial features of action from 
those he applies to himself and hence of incurring a transactional 
inconsistency. For the murderer, while participating purposively 
in the transaction, causes his recipient to lose all further possibility 
of fulfilling any of his own purposes. X's factual self-contradiction, 
then, is rationally justified because it helps to prevent this extreme 
transactional inconsistency, so that it is incurred in the service of 
the PCC. To be sure, lying is itself a violation of the PCC, insofar 
as X's lying to Z is fulfilling X's purpose while frustrating Z's. 
Nevertheless, in the situation as described, X's contradicting him-
self by lying to Z is subordinate, in respect of rational justification, 
to X's saving Y's life by the action, and the reason for this is found 
in the categorial content of the PCC. For the purposes fulfilled by 
preventing a murder are more basic than those that would be ful-
filled by telling the truth or being propositionally consistent in this 
situation. This example makes clear the points stressed above: that 
the formal consistency requirement must be considered together 
with its categorial content, and that the latter as well as the former 
is an application of reasonp. 
7. Objection. To regard moral principles and judgments as 
necessarily true is to attribute to them a much more stringent 
modality than that found in natural science. But this is anomalous. 
As philosophers since Aristotle have emphasized, each discipline 
must seek only that degree of precision which its subject-matter 
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admits of. Since the subject-matter of ethics is human actions and 
institutions, which involve much more variation than the subject· 
matter of the natural sciences (let alone mathematics), the moral 
principles and judgments which ethics propounds must be corre-
spondingly variable and contingent. 
Reply. In addition to the tradition stemming from Aristotle, 
there is another tradition (to which belong philosophers as other-
wise different as Locke and Kant) which regards moral judgments 
as necessarily true. In one respect there is no irreconcilable dis-
agreement between the two traditions, since the contingency which 
Aristotle emphasizes pertains to the context where moral rules are 
applied to particular cases amid all the variable circumstances in 
which they are involved, while the necessity which the other tradi-
tion emphasizes pertains rather to the ultimate principles them-
selves from which the particular judgments derive. The applica-
tions of the PCC must, indeed, take account of such variabilities as 
arise in trying to determine just when coercion or basic harm is 
being inflicted on some recipient or just how specific rules justified 
by the PCC may mitigate its prohibitions against coercion and basic 
harm. 
A justification can, however, be given for attributing to the 
PCC and its derivative moral rules a degree of stringency or neces-
sity superior to that found in the laws of the natural sciences. 
There is a unity of subject and object in morality which is not 
found in any of the natural sciences, including psychology, insofar 
as it is an empirical discipline. This, it must be emphasized, is not 
the same as Locke's point that moral knowledge can be certain 
because its objects are mixed modes made by the mind itself, which 
do not represent anything beyond themselves and hence can be 
completely known by the mind which made them. This point is 
compatible with a view of the "objects" of morality as completely 
conventional and even arbitrary constructs. My point is rather that 
morality sets rational requirements for rational agents; hence, the 
whole enterprise is under the control of reasonp in the ways traced 
above. In this respect, morality is unlike empirical psychology, 
where the independent variables are modes of behavior or of feel-
ing which are not the same as the intellectual and empirical pro-
cedures which study them; and this non-identity is still more ob-
vious in the relation between the knowing subject and the known 
objects in the other natural sciences. The rational agents for whom 
moral requirements are set are not in principle different £rom the 
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rational persons who ascertain what these requirements are, despite 
the greater degree of analytical precision which distinguishes the 
philosopher from the non-philosopher. 
The PCC, as traced above, follows from the concept of what 
it is to be a rational agent. Hence, the independent variable which 
determines the content of the moral principle is the same as the 
persons for whom that principle sets requirements. And these are 
indeed requirements, not only because they logically follow from 
necessary antecedents but also because the persons to whom they 
apply are emotional and conative beings as well as rational ones, so 
that they do not automatically fulfill the requirements set by rea-
son. Still, it is because of its central focus in reasonp that the 
principle of morality can attain the status of a necessary truth. 
I have tried to indicate in this lecture how both the formal 
consistency requirement of the PCC and its categorial content are 
applications of reason1., and hence how an egalitarian-universalist 
moral principle can be rationally justified. 
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The E. H. Lindley Memorial Lectureship Fund was established 
in 1911 in memory of Ernest H . Lindley, Chancellor of the U niver-
sity of Kansas from 1920 to 1939. In February 19H i\fr. Roy Rob-
erts, the chairman of the cornmiuee in charge, suggested in the 
Graduate Magazine that 
the Chancellor should invite tO the Univer~ity for a lecture 
or a series of lectures, some outstanding national or world 
figure to speak on "Values of Livi ng"-just as the late 
ChanceJJor proposed to do in his courses ''The Human 
Situation" and "Plan for Living." 
ln the following June Mr. Roberts circulated a leller on beh;llf of 
tlte Committee, proposing in somewhat broader terms that 
The income from this fund should be spent in a quest o( 
social betterment by bdnging to the University each year 
outstanding world leaders for a lecture or series of lectures, 
yet with a design so broad in its outline that in the ye<~rs to 
come, if it is deemed wise, this living memori<~ l cou ld take 
some more desirable form. 
The fund was allowed to accumulate until 1!)54, when Professor 
Richard McKeon lectured on "Human Rights and lntermttional 
R elations." The next lecture was given in 1959 by Profes!>Or Everett 
C. Ilughes, and has been published by the University of Kansas 
School of Law as part of his book Students' Cultw·e n11d Perspec-
tives: Lectures on Medical and General Ed11cntion. The selection 
of lecturers for tlte Lindley series has since been delegated to the 
Depanment of Phjlosophy. The fo llowing leclllres have been pub-
Jishccl, and may be obtained from the Depanmcnt at a price o£ 
seventy·fi ve cents each. 
1961. "The ld~:a of :\fan-An Outline of Philosophical \nthropoiOi,') ·" 
11y Jo.,C Ferratt:r ~fora, Professor of Philo,ophy, 8 1)11 \lawr College. 
1962. "Changes in E'ents a.nd Changes in Things." 
Ry A. N. Prior, Professor of Philo-ophy, UnheNity of :\1ancht:.~ter. 
19G:J. "Moral Philosophy and the Analysis of Language." 
Jly Richard B. 1\randt, Professor of Philosophy, Swanhmorc Collt•ge. 
1961. " lluman Freedom and the Self." 
lly Roderick ~f. Chisholm, Professor of Philosophy, Brown Univcu.ity. 
1965. " Jir(;cdom of ~lind." 
8) Stuart Hampshire, Professor of Philo~ophy, Princeton Uni\'cNity. 
1966. "Some Beliefs about Justice." 
n y William K. Frankena, Professor of Philosophy, University of Michigan. 
1967. "Fo11n and Content in Ethical Theory." 
By Wilfrid Sellar;, l'rofcssor of Philosophy, Uni\CI~ity of Pillsbnrgh. 
1968. "The Systematic Unity of Value." 
Ily J. N. Find Ia)', Clark Professor of Philosophy, Yale Uni\•ersity. 
1969. "Ruber and Buberistn-A CriLical Evaluation." 
Ry Paul Edwards, Professor of Philosophy, Brooklyn College of the City 
University of New York. 
I 97 I. "What Actually Happened." 
lly P. 1-1 . Nowcii·Smith, Profcs~or of Philosophy, York University. 
